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We propose a theoretical analysis of democratization processes in which
an elite extends the franchise to the poor when threatened with a revo-
lution. The poor could govern without changing the political system by
maintaining a continuous revolutionary threat on the elite. Revolutionary
threats, however, are costly to the poor and democracy is a superior sys-
tem in which political agreement is reached through costless voting. This
provides a rationale for democratic transitions that has not been discussed
in the literature.
1 Introduction
The theoretical analysis of democratization processes has made major advances
over the last decade; most notably with the highly in￿ uential work of Daron
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson1. Our paper contributes to this literature
by presenting a model of democratization closest in spirit to Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) but where revolutionary threats are costly for the poor and the
cost of a revolution is not random. We argue that the changes make the model
more realistic and, more important, reveal a rationale for democratization that
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1Seminal papers are Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) and their book-length treatment
of the subject in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). In this paper, our main point of reference
will be Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and assertions about these authors￿theory should be
understood as referring to this work. Most of what we say, however, would also apply to the
models in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001). The related literature is extensive; on the
particular topic of democratization processes we can mention Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Jack
and Laguno⁄ (2006a, 2006b), Fleck and Hansen (2006), Cervellati et al. (2008), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2008) and Acemoglu (2008).
1has not been discussed in the literature. In our model countries democratize to
reduce the costs of reaching agreements over public policy.
Acemoglu and Robinson study democratization processes in a game-theoretic
framework where two groups of agents, the elite and the poor, strategically
interact in order to decide the public policies of the country. Two features are
most salient in Acemoglu and Robinson￿ s theory of democratization: (i) the
role of revolutionary threats, and (ii) the importance of commitment problems
over future public policies. In a nutshell, revolutionary threats force the elite
to implement changes in the initial order of society and the impossibility to
commit to future public policies implies that the only change that will convince
the poor of not carrying a revolution is democratization.
In order to produce the above result, Acemoglu and Robinson resort to
two rather particular assumptions. First, they assume that threatening with a
revolution (without actually carrying one) entails no costs. Second, carrying a
revolution is costly to the poor but this cost is assumed to ￿ uctuate randomly
from period to period. Let us describe how these two assumptions are used in
Acemoglu and Robinson￿ s framework before discussing their plausibility.
The poor can threat with a revolution in any period but that does not mean
that their threat will be credible. A revolution entails important costs for the
poor, so their revolutionary threat will be credible only if the gains from carrying
a revolution outstrip the costs. The elite will make concessions to the poor only
if the revolutionary threat is credible; that is, only if the cost of a revolution is
relatively low.
Imagine that the cost of a revolution is constant and relatively low. In
that case there would be no need for democracy in the model of Acemoglu and
Robinson. On every period the poor would threat with carrying a revolution if
their preferred policy is not implemented, their threat would be credible and the
elite would yield to their demands. The elite could commit to follow the poor￿ s
preferred policy in all future periods and the commitment would be credible.
Consider now that the cost of a revolution varies randomly over time and,
as a consequence, the threat of a revolution is credible only in some periods.
In that case, a commitment from the elite to follow the poor￿ s optimal policy
would not be credible: as soon as the threat of revolution subsides the elite
2would retract their promise. As a consequence, a commitment to follow the
poor￿ s optimal policy in the future would not be enough to pacify the poor in
the periods where a revolutionary threat is credible. In such periods the only
option left to the elite in order to avoid a revolution would be to democratize. A
democracy is assumed to shift political power from the elite to the median voter
permanently. Since the median voter belongs to the poor, a democracy would
ensure that the poor￿ s preferred policy is adopted in all subsequent periods.
The mechanism just exposed is certainly ingenious, but are the premises on
which it is based credible? Let us start with the assumption that revolutionary
threats are costless to the poor. In order to threat with a revolution the poor
must organize marches, enforce strikes, block roads and resort to a whole range
of actions destined to show their power. None of these activities come cheap;
besides the direct costs they entail, the poor su⁄er from an absence of labor
income while performing them. The costs of a revolutionary threat are smaller
than those of a revolution but we believe that they are not negligible and can
play a signi￿cant role in justifying a democratic transition.
The second assumption highlighted above is the randomness of the cost
of carrying a revolution. Acemoglu and Robinson justify this assumption by
pointing out that the cost of a revolution depends on the organizational level of
the poor (or what they call the poor￿ s "de facto power") and that this last one
￿ uctuates over time. Thus, the poor may be well organized today and pose a
credible revolutionary threat but they may become disorganized tomorrow and
their cost of carrying a revolution would be so high that threatening with one
would not be credible.
We regard this hypothesis as unconvincing and lacking historical support.
It is certainly true that the organizational level of the poor evolved throughout
history; middle-age peasants were probably less likely to challenge the country￿ s
elite than their urbanite nineteen-century descendants. But that is not the same
as saying that the poor￿ s organizational level ￿ uctuates up and down randomly
over time. To a ￿rst approximation, Europe since the mid-nineteen century
could be characterized by a progressively increasing level of organization of the
working classes through the development of left wing parties and labor unions2.
2For instance, the average vote to European left-wing parties increased persistently from
4.7% in the early 1880s to 33% in the 1940s and stayed at that level until the 1980s (Bartolini
2000, table 2.2).
3It is probably fair to say that it was these groups￿solid position in the political
landscape rather than any hypothetical ￿ uctuations in their future power which
convinced the elites of the need to extend the franchise. Short-term ￿ uctuations
should not obscure the overall picture of an increasingly organized European
working class since, say, the Communist Manifesto.
This may be true even in the developing world, where early victories by
populist movements have often been followed by backlashes from the elite and
the military. The poor￿ s parties and movements usually remained alive through
these periods only to re-emerge, often stronger, once the conditions allowed.
Society was moving towards increasingly organized working classes, despite some
￿ uctuations around the trend.
An example of this pattern is provided by Argentina. The ￿rst fully demo-
cratic elections in Argentina took place in 1916, four years after the promulga-
tion of the Saenz Peæa Law which established universal, secret and compulsory
su⁄rage for all male citizens over the age of eighteen (Gallo 1986). The election
of 1916 saw the victory of the Radical Civic Union, an opposition party whose
support came mainly from outside the elite and was responsible for much of the
social protest that lead to the extension of the franchise. The Radical party
dominated elections until 1930, when a military coup gave power back to the
elite. Did this imply a loss of the electoral rights obtained and a disorgani-
zation of the lower classes? Hardly so; the Saenz Peæa Law was not repelled
and elections were held in 1931 and 1937 with participations rates higher than
previously3. The Radical party did not recover the presidency due to fraud
or proscription but "remained the largest of Argentina￿ s political movements"
(Rock 1991, p.16) and as such in￿ uenced political outcomes. The shift in the
balance of power away from the elite and towards the rest of society was not
a temporary phenomenon; it was a permanent change that was to lead to the
dominance of Argentine politics by Juan Domingo Peron starting in 1946.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 136-142) discuss three historical episodes
which they use to illustrate how the temporary nature of the poor￿ s de facto
power implies that the elite￿ s promises su⁄er from time inconsistency. These
episodes are the English Peasants￿Revolt of 1381, the Communeros Rebellion
3The elections of 1916, 1922 and 1928 had participation rates of 8.8, 8.8 and 12.9 per-
cent respectively. Those of 1931 and 1937 had participation rates of 11.1 and 14.2 percent
respectively (Vanhanen 2000).
4of 1781 and the Russian Revolution of 1905. None of these episodes is actually
related to the democratization processes of England, Colombia or Russia; which
took place one to several centuries afterwards. Moreover, we would argue that in
none of them did the elite actually implement any policy concession even in the
short term, so talk of time inconsistency - where promises are kept during some
time before being set aside - seems misplaced. In our view, these three episodes
(but most particularly the ￿rst two) actually refer to cases where the poor did
not hold "de facto power", or at any rate not enough of it, and nevertheless
decided to confront the elite. The elite was caught by surprise and made some
bogus promises in order to gain time and organize itself, but the promises were
never intended to be put in practice. The three episodes were won by the elite,
they are not good examples of how the poor can impose their policies during a
certain period.
Besides the two assumptions discussed above, Acemoglu and Robinson￿ s the-
ory is also questionable for some of its results. As the authors admit, democracy
arises precisely because the poor￿ s de facto power is only temporary. A society
where the poor have a permanent hold on de facto power would not become
democratic in their framework, something that we cannot help but ￿nd disturb-
ing.
Another surprising aspect of these authors￿theory is that it requires the poor
to be unusually foresighted: they realize the transitory nature of their de facto
power and this precisely at the moment when they are most powerful. This may
be too much to ask from the poor and does not seem to be supported by much
historical evidence.
The model we develop in this paper makes use of the attractive elements of
Acemoglu and Robinson￿ s theory of democratization while eliminating the more
questionable hypotheses discussed above. Revolutionary threats play a central
role in our model and the elite is unable to commit to future policies. Revolu-
tionary threats, however, are costly for the poor and we do not assume that the
poor￿ s organizational capabilities or de facto power ￿ uctuates over time. The
resulting model is, we believe, more transparent and o⁄ers an alternative inter-
pretation of the reasons that led, and keep leading, societies towards democracy.
52 Our model of democratization
We use a modelling framework most closely related to Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) in order to make comparisons between our mechanism and theirs as
clear as possible. An important di⁄erence is that in our model the poor start
by deciding whether they want to threat with a revolution (and incur the cost
that this supposes) or not. This step is not present in Acemoglu and Robinson:
since revolutionary threats have no cost in their model the poor will always pose
a threat (which can then be credible or not).
We consider an in￿nite-period economy populated by a continuum of people
of measure 1. Two groups exist in this society: the poor, who constitute a
proportion ￿ of total population, and the elite, who constitute the remaining
1￿￿: Within each of these groups all members are identical and we abstract from
collective action problems. The poor are more numerous (￿ > 1=2), implying
that in a democratic regime the median voter would be a poor person.
The poor receive each period a per capita income of yp, and the correspond-
ing amount for each member of the elite is yr > yp: The average income of
the economy, y = ￿yp + (1 ￿ ￿)yr, will be normalized to 1: It follows that all
monetary quantities to be used in this model, including the costs of threats and
revolution that we introduce below, will be expressed in relative terms with re-
spect to the average income of the society. Notice that this normalization also
implies that yr > 1 > yp:
There is one public policy in this economy: a ￿ at tax rate on income whose
proceedings are distributed equally among all members of society. There are no
costs associated with the collection and redistribution of this tax. The after-tax
income of the poor and the elite will be, respectively, e yp = (1 ￿ ￿)yp + ￿ and
e yr = (1￿￿)yr +￿ where ￿ is the tax rate and a tilde denotes after-tax incomes.
After-tax incomes are simply a weighted average between pre-tax incomes and
the average income of society (which equals 1); the weights being determined
by the tax rate. It follows that e yp > yp and e yr < yr:
Determining the optimal tax rate for the poor and the elite is straightfor-
ward: the poor would like a tax rate equal to 1 (in which case after-tax incomes
would equal 1 for everybody) and the elite would like a tax rate equal to 0:
Notice that we are restricting the tax rate to lie in the interval (0;1): Clearly,
6less extreme solutions would be obtained by incorporating tax collection costs
but the mechanics of the model would remain unchanged4.
The tax rate to be implemented in practice will depend on the political
system in place. We consider two potential political systems: non democracy
and democracy. With a democracy all agents vote to chose the tax rate and the
median voter theorem applies. Since the median voter belongs to the poor, a
democracy leads to the poor￿ s preferred tax rate. Under a non democracy the
elite holds all political power and is free to set any tax rate. In principle this
would translate into a tax rate equal to zero, but the elite has the possibility of
setting a di⁄erent rate. This is important since the model will allow the elite to
o⁄er such concessions to the poor when a revolutionary threat exists.
The economy starts as a non democracy. The sequence of events in the
￿rst period, and in all subsequent periods that start as a non democracy, is
given in Figure 1. The poor move ￿rst and have two choices: to remain calm
and accept the status quo ("no threat") or to threat the elite with a revolution
unless democracy is put in place. If the poor chose not to threat, the elite sets
the tax rate to 0 and the game repeats itself next period.
To threat with a revolution the poor must organize marches, strikes and
blockades. All these actions will cause each poor agent a per capita cost of ￿:
For simplicity, the elite does not su⁄er any cost from a revolutionary threat.
A revolution would involve violence, major interruptions in production and the
destruction of parts of the capital stock. A revolution will cause a per capita
cost of ￿ to all agents in the economy5. We will assume that ￿ = ￿￿ with ￿ > 1,
i.e. a revolution is several times more costly than a threat of revolution. As
discussed before, in the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson we would have
￿ = 0 and ￿ would be a random variable.
If the poor decide to threat with a revolution the elite has two options.
First, the elite can yield to the demands of the poor and accept to democratize
right away. In this case the political system would remain a democracy for all
subsequent periods. The second possibility is for the elite to refuse democracy
but o⁄er a policy concession instead. In this case the political system would
4Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) assume increasing and convex costs of collection.
5Results would be unchanged if we assumed that a revolution causes di⁄erent costs to the
elite and the poor.
7remain a non democracy but the elite sets the tax rate at some level in the
interval (0;1): This case includes the possibility that the elite does not make
any concession at all; which would correspond to an o⁄er of setting the tax rate
to 0: It also includes, at the other extreme, the o⁄er of setting the tax rate to 1
and therefore mimicking the after-tax incomes under democracy.
If the elite denies democracy but o⁄ers to set the tax rate equal to ￿ 2 (0;1)
the poor have two options. One possibility is to accept the o⁄er of the elite, in
which case the proposed taxing and redistribution will take place and the game
repeats itself the next period. Alternatively, the poor can refuse and carry on
with a revolution. In this case the poor and the elite will su⁄er the cost of a
revolution and a democracy will be established as a result. As was the case
with the peaceful transition, a democracy becomes permanent once established.
Figure 1 shows the four possible outcomes of the game, which are labelled as: (1)
Non Democracy, (2) Democracy, (3) Non Democracy with policy concessions,
and (4) Revolution, followed by Democracy.
We will characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria of this game
in which strategies depend only on the actions taken during the current period.
If the result of the ￿rst period is non democracy (with or without a policy con-
cession) then the game would be repeated and, in a Markov perfect equilibrium,
the same result would be obtained in all subsequent periods (there is neither
randomness nor time-varying values in the model). If the result of the ￿st pe-
riod is democracy, with or without a revolution, all subsequent periods will be
devoid of any strategic interaction and the poor￿ s preferred tax rate will be in
place. It follows that there are also four outcomes in the in￿nite-period version
of the game: if the ￿rst period ends in outcomes 1 or 3 then all future periods
will end up the same way; if the ￿rst period ends in outcomes 2 or 4 democracy
will prevail in all future periods.
As in the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson, the elite cannot credible
commit to future policy concessions. This is immediate in our model since, in
the absence of democracy, the elite will chose their preferred tax rate each time
there is no revolutionary threat. The option of a policy concession from the elite
is thus understood to apply to the present period only. We may assume that
the elite explicitly o⁄ers a temporary change in the tax rate or, alternatively,
that it promises a permanent change but the poor understand that the promise
will be broken in the absence of future threats.






i = p;r and ￿ < 1 is a discount factor. The payo⁄s for a member of the poor
and a member of the elite in each of the game￿ s four possible outcomes are given
below.
1. If the poor do not threat with a revolution, tax rates would remain at zero







2. If the poor threat with a revolution and the elite accepts to democratize,
after tax incomes would be equal to 1 for both agents and the poor would

















[(1 ￿ ￿)yr + ￿]
It is noteworthy that in this case the poor will su⁄er the cost of threatening
with a revolution on every period. Indeed, by choosing not to revolt the poor
ensure the continuity of a non democratic regime that will set positive tax rates
only if the revolutionary threat is kept alive.
4. The ￿nal possibility is to have a revolution followed by democracy. Payo⁄s
would the same as in the case of a peaceful democratic transition minus









The payo⁄s just derived reveal an unambiguous ranking of outcomes for the
rich. Indeed:
V r(ND) > V r(PC) > V r(D) > V r(RD)
We cannot rank the payo⁄s of the poor in a similar way but we can es-
tablish two inequalities. The ￿rst one is evident: V p(D) > V p(RD); which
simply states that it is better to achieve democracy without the cost of a revo-
lution. The second inequality is more revealing and is at the center of our model:
V p(D) > V p(PC): This result is worthy of notice because a regime of policy
concession could set a tax rate equal to 1, the tax rate that would prevail in a
democracy. Even in this most favorable case, however, the poor would be better
o⁄ in a democracy because they would not bear the cost of keeping a constant
revolutionary threat on the elite. In other words, democracy￿ s superiority is
assured by its ability to save on the costs of reaching a political agreement. In
the regime of policy concessions agreement is reached through a costly demon-
stration of force from the part of the poor. In democracy agreement is reached
by costless voting.
With these payo⁄s in hand, we set up to solve the model by backward
induction. The last possible stage of the game requires the poor to accept or
reject the elite￿ s o⁄er of a policy concession. The poor will accept if V p(PC) ￿
V p(RD) or, substituting with the expressions derived above, if:
1
1 ￿ ￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)yp + ￿ ￿ ￿] ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Solving this inequality for ￿ (and using ￿ = ￿￿) yields:
￿ ￿ 1 +
1
1 ￿ yp (￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1)
In other words, the poor will accept the elite￿ s proposal if it is generous
enough; which will be the case if the tax rate they o⁄er is above - or at least
10equal - to the threshold value ￿￿:
The threshold value ￿￿ can lie outside of the interval (0;1) depending on the
values of the cost parameters ￿ and ￿ and the discount rate ￿: Equation (1)
reveals that ￿￿ will be larger than 1 if ￿ <
￿
1￿￿; between 0 and 1 if
￿
1￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿







Turning to the previous stage of the game, the elite must decide whether
to o⁄er a policy concession or to democratize when faced with a revolutionary
threat. If the elite can o⁄er a policy concession that the poor will accept, that
is if ￿￿ ￿ 1, they will do so. The reason is that a policy concession is the
best possible outcome for the elite facing a revolutionary threat (V r(PC) >
V r(D) > V r(RD) ). If ￿￿ 2 (0;1) the elite will o⁄er ￿ = ￿￿, the lowest possible
tax rate that will deter a revolution. If ￿￿ < 0 the elite will o⁄er no concession,
i.e. ￿ = 0; knowing that this will be taken. If ￿￿ > 1; ￿nally, there is no tax
rate that will stop the poor from revolting. In this case the elite will accept to
democratize immediately to avoid the cost of a revolution.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, ￿nally, the poor will decide whether to threat
with a revolution or not taking into account the elite￿ s response as described
above. It is apparent that if ￿￿ < 0 the poor will choose not to threat since a
threat will produce a cost and no reward.
If ￿￿ 2 (0;1) the poor can get a policy concession by threatening. They will
decide to threat if V p(PC) > V p(ND); which is equivalent to
1
1 ￿ ￿
[(1 ￿ ￿￿)yp + ￿￿ ￿ ￿] >
yp
1 ￿ ￿




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
￿ ￿
l(￿)
If, ￿nally, ￿￿ > 1 the poor know that threatening with a revolution will lead
the elite to democratize straight away. Threatening will be a bene￿cial strategy












The above derived conditions complete the analysis of the model, all possible
equilibria are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There are ￿ve Markov perfect equilibria in the in￿nite period
model under consideration.
1. If ￿ > ￿￿(￿); implying ￿￿ < 0; the poor will never threat with a revolution
and the country will remain a non democracy.
2. If
￿
1￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿(￿); implying 0 < ￿￿ < 1; and ￿ > ￿
l(￿) the poor will never
threat with a revolution and the country will remain a non democracy.
3. If
￿
1￿￿ < ￿ < ￿￿(￿); implying 0 < ￿￿ < 1; and ￿ < ￿
l(￿) the poor will
threat with a revolution on every period and every period they will obtain
a policy concession which sets the tax rate to ￿￿: The poor will accept this
policy concession every period.
4. If ￿ <
￿
1￿￿; implying ￿￿ > 1; and ￿ > ￿
h the poor will never threat with a
revolution and the country will remain a non democracy.
5. If ￿ <
￿
1￿￿; implying ￿￿ > 1; and ￿ < ￿
h the poor will threat with a
revolution and the elite will accept to democratize the political system.
The equilibria are thus determined by the value of the two cost parameters
in the model, ￿ and ￿: We illustrate the above result in ￿gure 2, which divides
the cost parameters space in the di⁄erent regions de￿ned by proposition 16.
Regions closer to the origin correspond to cases where the costs of threat and
revolution are low and they result in democracy or in policy concessions. If both
￿ and ￿ move over time towards zero the result will necessarily be democracy.
Regions far from the origin correspond to cases with high costs of threats and
revolution and they result in non democracy.






￿￿(￿) = 1; lim
￿!0
￿l(￿) = ￿h; lim
￿!1
￿l(￿) = 0 and 8￿ : ￿l(￿) < ￿￿(￿) where ￿l(￿) is the inverse function of
￿l(￿): We also note that ￿l(￿) intersects the line ￿ =
￿
1￿￿ at the value ￿ = 1 ￿ yp:
12If we interpret the costs of threats and revolution as Acemoglu and Robinson
do, that is as re￿ ecting the organizational level of the poor, the result is intuitive:
as the poor become more and more organized the political system will necessarily
become a democracy. A non democratic system with policy concessions will
typically be an intermediate step between non democracy and democracy7.
Once the cost of carrying a revolution is low enough, policy concessions will
not stop a revolution and the elite is forced to democratize. The rationale for
this, however, is very di⁄erent from the one o⁄ered by Acemoglu and Robinson.
According to these authors, policy concessions are not enough because they will
be removed in the future. And they will be removed in the future because the
poor￿ s de facto power ￿ uctuates randomly over time. In our model the poor￿ s de
facto power does not ￿ uctuate and the poor can be sure that policy concessions
will be maintained in all future periods. The need for democracy arises from
the fact that such non democratic regime with policy concessions is costly to
maintain; a continuous threat of revolution is necessary to ensure the elite￿ s
compliance. Democracy is thus a superior outcome since political agreement is
reached by costless voting.
Other results from our model are similar to those obtained by Acemoglu
and Robinson. Higher income inequality, for instance, leads to a larger range of
the parameter space being characterized by democracy or policy concessions8.
Another result in common with Acemoglu and Robinson is that no revolutions
take place in equilibrium. We regard this as a realistic feature of these models:
revolutions have been rare events throughout history and the instances where
democracy has been obtained after revolutionary threats, but before a full rev-
olution hit the streets, are much more numerous. More often than not, the
elite recognizes that resistance to the poor￿ s demands would be futile and act
in consequence.
7Non Democracy with policy concessions will always be an intermediate step between Non
Democracy and Democracy if ￿ is below 1 ￿ yp: This is not a demanding condition: the per
capita cost of threatening with a revolution, ￿, is likely to be less than 1 ￿ yp, the di⁄erence
between average income and the per capita income of the poor. In other words, we would
expect most countries to be placed well on the left in Figure 2.
8To see this, notice that - since average income is normalized to 1 - income inequality can
be measure by the distance between average income and the poor￿ s income, 1 ￿ yp: In ￿gure
2 an increase in 1 ￿ yp would shift ￿h; ￿l(￿) and ￿￿(￿) to the right, leading to larger areas
where democracy or non democracy with policy concessions would be the outcome.
133 Conclusion
The work of Acemoglu and Robinson discussed in this paper has clearly ad-
vanced our understanding of democratization processes. Their emphasis on the
role of revolutionary threats is, we believe, historically relevant9. Elites agreed
to extend the franchise knowing that this would hurt their future interests only
because the remaining alternative would have been even more damaging.
Acemoglu and Robinson also advance an economic justi￿cation for democ-
racy. Their thesis is that people demand democracy not because they enjoy
it or feel that open political competition is more just than monarchical or oli-
garchic regimes but because it solves a commitment problem over future public
policies. In their framework, the poor would be glad to overlook democracy if
they could get their preferred public policies all the time. Because the poor￿ s de
facto power ￿ uctuates over time, the only way they can obtain this is by forcing
the elite to democratize in the period when their de facto power is high.
This paper o⁄ers an alternative economic justi￿cation for democracy: democ-
racy is a cost-saving device. We start by making the assumption that the poor￿ s
de facto power does not ￿ uctuate over time; so they could impose their preferred
policies period after period by demonstrating their force. This, however, would
be a costly way to reach political consensus, with force being the poor￿ s only
available argument. Democracy saves on these costs by substituting strikes and
marches for votes, thus delivering the same public policy outcomes through a
smoother process.
9Przeworski (2008) o⁄ers a much-welcomed analysis of the historical evidence.
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